This book is a collection of secondary essays on America's most important philosophic thinkers—statesmen, judges, writers, educators, and activists—from the colonial period to the present. Each essay is a comprehensive introduction to the thought of a noted American on the fundamental meaning of the American regime.

One of the most important books of the twentieth century, Karl Popper's The Open Society and Its Enemies is an uncompromising defense of liberal democracy and a powerful attack on the intellectual origins of totalitarianism. Popper was born in 1902 to a Viennese family of Jewish origin. He taught in Austria until 1937, when he emigrated to New Zealand in anticipation of the Nazi annexation of Austria the following year, and he settled in England in 1949. Before the annexation, (...) Popper had written mainly about the philosophy of science, but from 1938 until the end of the Second World War he focused his energies on political philosophy, seeking to diagnose the intellectual origins of German and Soviet totalitarianism. The Open Society and Its Enemies was the result. An immediate sensation when it was first published in two volumes in 1945, Popper's monumental achievement has attained legendary status on both the Left and Right and is credited with inspiring anticommunist dissidents during the Cold War. Arguing that the spirit of free, critical inquiry that governs scientific investigation should also apply to politics, Popper traces the roots of an opposite, authoritarian tendency to a tradition represented by Plato, Marx, and Hegel. In a substantial new introduction written for this edition, acclaimed political philosopher Alan Ryan puts Popper's landmark work in biographical, intellectual, and historical context. Also included is a personal essay by eminent art historian E.H. Gombrich, in which he recounts the story of the book's eventual publication despite numerous rejections and wartime deprivations. (shrink)

Early versions of satellite and radiosonde datasets suggested that the tropical surface had warmed more than the troposphere, while climate models consistently showed tropospheric amplification of surface warming in response to human-caused increases in greenhouse gases. We revisit such comparisons here using new observational estimates of surface and tropospheric temperature changes. We find that there is no longer a serious discrepancy between modeled and observed trends in the tropics. Our results contradict a recent claim that all simulated temperature trends in (...) the tropical troposphere are inconsistent with observations. This claim was based on the use of older radiosonde and satellite datasets and on two methodological errors: the neglect of observational trend uncertainties introduced by interannual climate variability and application of an inappropriate statistical “consistency test”.This emerging reconciliation of models and observations has two primary explanations. First, because of changes in the treatment of buoy and satellite information, new surface temperature datasets yield slightly reduced tropical warming relative to earlier versions. Second, recently developed satellite and radiosonde datasets now show larger warming of the tropical lower troposphere. In the case of a new satellite dataset from remote sensing systems, enhancedRSS warming is due to an improved procedure of adjusting for inter-satellite biases. When the RSS-derived tropospheric temperature trend is compared with four different observed estimates of surface temperature change, the surface warming is invariably amplified in the tropical troposphere, consistent with model results. Even if we use data from a second satellite dataset with smaller tropospheric warming than in remote sensing systems RSS, observed tropical lapse rates are not significantly different from those in all model simulations.Our results contradict a recent claim that all simulated temperature trends in the tropical troposphere and in tropical lapse rates are inconsistent with observations. This claim was based on the use of older radiosonde and satellite datasets and on two methodological errors: the neglect of observational trend uncertainties introduced by interannual climate variability and application of an inappropriate statistical “consistency test”. (shrink)

The thesis of this book is that Herbert Marcuse is "indispensable to the theory and practice of the New Left." The one-dimensional quality of contemporary everyday life is to be disrupted by a critical theory of society based upon the works of Karl Marx as interpreted and brought to bear upon the 20th Century. Hence, this collection of six New Left studies on Herbert Marcuse is called Critical Interruptions. The contributors are former students of Marcuse and all are younger (...) than thirty-five. The work is dedicated to Theodor W. Adorno and Ho Chi-Minh. The book is poorly edited; not only does the heavy Marcusean terminology make intelligibility slow; but poor rhetoric, grammar and punctuation also add to the slowness of the pace. The content of the essays, however, is uniformly very worthwhile and the book deserves a careful reading. The Marcuse Festschrift of 1967, edited by Kurt H. Wolff and Barrington Moore, Jr., entitled The Critical Spirit, was a collection of essays "in honor of Herbert Marcuse." This 1970 book, Critical Interruptions, is addressed to the exposition, up-dating and critique of Marcuse himself. Therefore, this present work is of immediate help to all readers and students of Marcuse. Paul Breines, the editor, wrote the first essay, "From Guru to Spectre: Marcuse and the Implosion of the Movement"; this is a history of Marcuse's relation to the New Left over the past few years. The second essay, "Individuation as Praxis," by Shierry M. Weber, is an incisive and insightful critique of the New Left while studying the meaning of praxis, the personal dimensions of individuality and exploring realistic alternatives for a viable counter culture. "Reversals and Lost Meanings" by Russell Jacoby is a short attempt at dialectics. William Leiss' study, "The Critical Theory of Society: Present Situation and Future Tasks," is a fine review of the major representatives of the Frankfurt School of social philosophers. "On Sexuality and Politics in the Work of Herbert Marcuse" by John David Ober, explains the continuity and development in Marcuse's thought on sexuality from Eros and Civilization through One-Dimensional Man. Finally, the last essay, "One-Dimensionality: The Universal Semiotic of Technological Experience" by Jeremy J. Shapiro is an extended commentary on Marcuse's most recent thought as applied to the advancing technology of the age. The editor openly disclaims any inner unity to the six essays. The studies, however, reveal that at least these six students of Marcuse from the New Left understand the Master very well and are able to extend his thought successfully to key contemporary issues. At the end, there is a greater unity to the book than the editor anticipated.--E. W. R. (shrink)

This is the first of six volumes, the last of which is scheduled for publication in late 1970. Altogether they will comprise "a comprehensive survey of central theological topics conducted by a group of writers in basic sympathy with each other, whose theological views have emerged from a serious and disciplined study of the relevant sources and from an awareness of the problems posed by life and thought in the modern world." The Encyclopedia is being published simultaneously in English, French, (...) German, Dutch, Italian, and Spanish editions and it has been billed as an international project. In actual fact, a German, and particularly, Rahnerian point of view overwhelmingly predominates in this first volume. This may be all to the good but the statistics are nonetheless revealing. Each of the 120 articles and parts of articles is signed, by one or more of a total of ninety different authors. But out of these ninety, fourteen contributors,, account for approximately 42 per cent of the writing. Rahner himself has authored eight articles or parts of articles and ninety-eight columns; i.e., approximately 12 per cent of the total space. In short, this first volume certainly reflects what Karl Rahner is thinking. Whether that is what Catholic theology as a whole is or ought to be thinking is, of course, another question altogether. The more significant articles include those on "Angel" ; "Apocrypha" ; "Apologetics" ; "Baptism" ; "Bible" and "Biblical Exegesis" ; "Bishop" ; "Charity" ; "Christianity" ; "Church" ; "Church and State" ; "Church and World" ; "Church History" ; "Confirmation". Also deserving of mention are philosophical articles by Jörg Splett: "Agnosticism," "Analogy of Being," "Anthropomorphism," "Body," "Categories," "Concept," and "Consciousness." These articles are almost Leibnizian in their clarity and conciseness. They are written from a definite point of view, viz., transcendental Thomism strongly influenced by Heidegger; but they quite ably speak for themselves and their subject matter. The focus of most of the articles is on the current state of discussion in Catholic theology. The attempt to be up to date is reflected on almost every page, with numerous citations from the documents of Vatican II. No attempt has been made to render the articles definitive in terms of detail or scope. Thus the title Encyclopedia is somewhat misleading if it is meant to indicate that the present work is in the same genre as, say, the Hastings' Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics or the Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique. Sacramentum Mundi is more like a contemporary Summa than a multi-dimensional and exhaustive encyclopedia.--E. A. R. (shrink)

The paper studies a domain theoretical notion of primitive recursion over partial sequences in the context of Scott domains. Based on a non-monotone coding of partial sequences, this notion supports a rich concept of parallelism in the sense of Plotkin. The complexity of these functions is analysed by a hierarchy of classes ${\cal E}^{\bot}_n$ similar to the Grzegorczyk classes. The functions considered are characterised by a function algebra ${\cal R}^{\bot}$ generated by continuity preserving operations starting from computable initial functions. Its (...) layers ${\cal R}^{\bot}_n$ are related to those above by showing $\forall n \ge 2.{\cal E}^{\bot}_{n+1} ={\cal R}^{\bot}_n$ , thus generalising results of Schwichtenberg/Müller and Niggl. (shrink)

We show the existence of a high r. e. degree bounding only joins of minimal pairs and of a high2 nonbounding r. e. degree. MSC: 03D25.

We will prove in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory without axiom of choice that the transitive hull R* of a relation R is not much “bigger” than R itself. As a measure for the size of a relation we introduce the notion of κ+-narrowness using surjective Hartogs numbers rather than the usul injective Hartogs values. The main theorem of this paper states that the transitive hull of a κ+-narrow relation is κ+-narrow. As an immediate corollary we obtain that, for every infinite cardinal (...) κ, the class HCκ of all κ-hereditary sets is a set with von Neumann rank ϱ(HCκ) ≤ κ+. Moreover, ϱ(HCκ) = κ+ if and only if κ is singular, otherwise ϱ(HCκ) = κ. The statements of the corollary are well known in the presence of the axiom of choice (AC). To prove them without AC - as carried through here - is, however, much harder. A special case of the corollary (κ = ω1, i.e., the class HCω1 of all hereditarily countable sets) has been treated independently by T. JECH. (shrink)

The paper builds on both a simply typed term system ${\cal PR}^\omega$ and a computation model on Scott domains via so-called parallel typed while programs (PTWP). The former provides a notion of partial primitive recursive functional on Scott domains $D_\rho$ supporting a suitable concept of parallelism. Computability on Scott domains seems to entail that Kleene's schema of higher type simultaneous course-of-values recursion (scvr) is not reducible to partial primitive recursion. So extensions ${\cal PR}^{\omega e}$ and PTWP $^e$ are studied that (...) are closed under scvr. The twist are certain type 1 Gödel recursors ${\cal R}_k$ for simultaneous partial primitive recursion. Formally, ${\cal R}_k\vec{g}\vec{H}xi$ denotes a function $f_i \in D_{\iota\to\iota}$ , however, ${\cal R}_k$ is modelled such that $f_i$ is finite, or in other words, a partial sequence. As for PTWP $^e$ , the concept of type $\iota\to\iota$ writable variables is introduced, providing the possibility of creating and manipulating partial sequences. It is shown that the PTWP $^e$ -computable functionals coincide with those definable in ${\cal PR}^{\omega e}$ plus a constant for sequential minimisation. In particular, the functionals definable in ${\cal PR}^{\omega e}$ denoted ${\cal R}^{\omega e}$ can be characterised by a subclass of PTWP $^e$ -computable functionals denoted ${\rm PPR}^{\omega e}$ . Moreover, hierarchies of strictly increasing classes ${\cal R}^{\omega e}_n$ in the style of Heinermann and complexity classes ${\rm PPR}^{\omega e}_n$ are introduced such that $\forall n\ge 0. {\cal R}^{\omega e}_n ={\rm PPR}^{\omega e}_n$ . These results extend those for ${\cal PR}^\omega$ and PTWP [Nig94]. Finally, scvr is employed to define for each type $\sigma$ the enumeration functional $E^\sigma$ of all finite elements of $D_\sigma$. (shrink)

Two simply typed term systems $\sf {PR}_1$ and $\sf {PR}_2$ are considered, both for representing algorithms computing primitive recursive functions. $\sf {PR}_1$ is based on primitive recursion, $\sf {PR}_2$ on recursion on notation. A purely syntactical method of determining the computational complexity of algorithms in $\sf {PR}_i$ , called $\mu$ -measure, is employed to uniformly integrate traditional results in subrecursion theory with resource-free characterisations of sub-elementary complexity classes. Extending the Schwichtenberg and Müller characterisation of the Grzegorczyk classes ${\mathcal{E}}_n$ for $n\ge (...) 3$ , it is shown $\mathcal{E}_{n+1} = \mathcal{R}^n_1 $ for $ n\ge 1 $, where $ \mathcal{R}^n_i$ denotes the \emph{ $n$ th modified Heinermann class} based on $\mu$ . The proof does not refer to any machine-based computation model, unlike the Schwichtenberg and Müller proofs. This is due to the notion of modified recursion lying on top of each other provided by $\mu$ . By Ritchie's result, $\mathcal{R}^1_1$ characterises the linear-space computable functions. Using the same method, a short and straightforward proof is presented, showing that $\mathcal{R}^1_2$ characterises the polynomial time computable functions. Furthermore, the classes $\mathcal{R}^n_2$ and $\mathcal{R}^n_1$ coincide at and above level 2. (shrink)

The paper builds on a simply typed term system ${\cal PR}^\omega $ providing a notion of partial primitive recursive functional on arbitrary Scott domains $D_\sigma$ that includes a suitable concept of parallelism. Computability on the partial continuous functionals seems to entail that Kleene's schema of higher type simultaneous course-of-values recursion (SCVR) is not reducible to partial primitive recursion. So an extension ${\cal PR}^{\omega e}$ is studied that is closed under SCVR and yet stays within the realm of subrecursiveness. The twist (...) are certain type 1 Gödel recursors ${\cal R}_k$ for simultaneous partial primitive recursion. Formally, the value ${\cal R}_k\vec{g}\vec{H} x i$ is a function $f_i$ of type $\iota \to \iota$ , however, ${\cal R}_k$ is modelled such that $f_i$ is a finite element of $D_{\iota\to\iota}$ or in other words, a partial sequence. It is shown that the Ackermann function is not definable in ${\cal PR}^{\omega e}$. (shrink)

Shoemaker (1996) presenteda prioriarguments against the possibility of ‘self‐blindness’, or the inability of someone, otherwise intelligent and possessed of mental concepts, to introspect any of her concurrent attitude states. Ironically enough, this seems to be a position that Gopnik (1993) and Carruthers (2006, 2008, 2009a,b) have proposed as not only possible, but as the actual human condition generally! According to this ‘Objectivist’ view, supposed introspection of one's attitudes is not ‘direct’, but an ‘inference’ of precisely the sort we make about (...) the attitudes of others, an inference that has the advantage in our own case ofonlyour own sensory data and memories, our behavior, and of the context we are in; i.e. we are all substantially self‐ blind. After sorting out a number of methodological and verbal issues, I argue, first, that thea prioriarguments against Objectivism don't succeed, and that Gopnik and Carruthers are right to regard the issue as an empirical one. On the other hand, I think they seriously underestimate the difficulty of establishing Objectivism. It is unlikely there is an inferential procedure from the data of pure sensation, behavior and context to the relevant self‐attributions that would be as spectacularly reliable as people manifestly seem to be. Moreover, there is a simpler model: the mind very likely consists of a panoply of sub‐routines some of whose outputs are ‘tagged’ for their having been so processed, rather in the way that software ‘documents’ are on standard computers. Introspection plausibly consists in a person's simply attending to distinctive constellations of these tags, even though they may lack phenomenal feels. This draws attention to an important independent fact: that much of phenomenology (or ‘what it's like’ to be in a certain state) may be constituted by facts that are not phenomenal. (shrink)

Rombach, H. Die Gegenwart der Philosophie.--Möller, J. Philosophie als Antihumanismus?--Schaeffler, R. Zum Verhältnis von transzendentaler und historischer Reflexion.--Balmer, H. P. Produktivität und Rezeptivität.--Marx, W. Das Bedürfnis der Philosophie.--Mader, J. Philosophie als Kritik.--Hommes, U. Sein und Sinn.--Sobrevilla, D. Ortega und der deutsche Idealismus.--Kohlenberger, H. Robert Musils philosophischer Anspruch.--Schwartländer, J. Die Menschenrechte und die Notwendigkeit einer praktischen Weltorientierung.--Heintel, E. Vom Sinn der Freundschaft.--Oeser, E. Die wissenschaftstheoretische Wende der Philosophie.--Simon, J. Zu einem philosophischen Begriff der Kausalität.--Schäfer, L. Der wissenschaftstheoretische Status synthetischer Urteile a (...) priori.--Lütterfelds, W. Das kategoriale Apriori des Erfahrungsfortschritts. (shrink)

Glaubensbegrun̈dung ais Wahrheitsgeschehen, voir E. Biser.--Epikur und Karl Marx oder ein subjektiver Faktor im Fall der Atome, von E. bloch.--Empirismus in der Transzsndentalphilosophie von H. Braun.--Gedanken abselts der dichotomlschen Welterklar̀ung,von K. K. Cho.--Nietzsches Kritik der Moral und die Ansaẗze der existenzphilosophischer Ethik, von H. Fahrenbach.--Hegel ub̈er Nutzen und Nachtell der Philosophie fur̈ den Staart, von H. F. Fjulda.--Anmerkungen zu dem Thema "Hegel und Habermas.----von GH. G. Gadamer.--Arbeit und Internktion, von J. Habermas.--Zwischen Natur und Geschichte, von S. Hosoya.--Das Ende der (...) Unendlichkelt. von G. Knauss.--Historia Magistra Vitae, von R. Koselleck.--Die philosophische Situation selt kant, von G. Krug̈er.--Absolute Reflexion und Sprache, von W. Marx.--Hegel und Gans, von M. Riedel.--Die Moral zwischen Natur und Geschichte, von P. Rossi.--Bemerkungen zu Schopenhauer, von W. Schulz.--A Note on Lucretius, von L. Strauss.--Das Logische Nackte, von W. Szilasl.--Grundmotive der Sozialphilosophie Hegels, von E topitsch.--Zeit und Zeitlosigkelt in der Philosophie A. N. Whiteheads, von R. Wiehl.--Die Anfan̈ge der Phil. (shrink)

Wiplinger, F. Metaphysik, Logik, Sprachkritik.--Mück, O. Wahrheit und Verifikation.--Strasser, S. Zur Konsensustheorie der Wahrheit.--Rivera de Ventosa, E. Dialektik und Dialog.--Schöndorfer, U. Ganzheitliche Erkenntnistheorie.--Lotz, J. B. Denken als Vollzug im Ganzen.--Benedikt, M. Orientierung und Architektonik.--Schaff, A. Ein Marxist liest die Integrale Logik.--Ricoeur, P. Wissenschaft und Ideologie.--Kohlenberger, H. Geschichtsprozess als Integration.--Huber, G. Zur Grundproblematik der philosophischen Anthropologie.--Wisser, R. Schöpfung und Schöpfertum in der Philosophie.--Verosta, S. Zum Verhältnis von Ordnung und Macht.--Schneider, H. Politische Ethik in der gegenwärtigen Normenkrise.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:An American Scholar Recalls Karl Barth’s Golden Years as a Teacher (1958–1964) by Raymond Kemp Anderson, and: The Westminster Handbook to Karl Barth ed. by Richard E. BurnettMatthew R. JantzenAn American Scholar Recalls Karl Barth’s Golden Years as a Teacher (1958–1964) Raymond Kemp Anderson lewiston, ny: edwin mellen press, 2013. 438 pp. $159.95The Westminster Handbook to Karl Barth Edited by Richard E. Burnett louisville, (...) ky: westminster john knox press, 2013. 242 pp. $35.00On April 2, 1966, Karl Barth received a letter from Peter Vogelsanger, informing him that Emil Brunner—the recipient of Barth’s thunderous “Nein!” on the subject of natural theology in 1934—was on his deathbed. Two days later, Barth responded and asked Vogelsanger to tell Brunner that “the time when I thought I should say No to him is long since past, and we all live only by the fact that a great and merciful God speaks his gracious Yes to all of us.” The irenic, compassionate, and affirming tone of this letter is typical of the “mature” Barth, whom Raymond Anderson studied under from 1958 to 1964 as a ThD student at the University of Basel. This period of doctoral study is the subject of Anderson’s interesting and eminently readable new book. Anderson enjoyably weaves together several different genres in his reflections on his experience with Barth, smoothly transitioning back and forth between personal memoir, constructive theological argument, and thoughtful interpretation of Barth’s life and writings.Structurally, the book offers a series of recollections and reflections gathered loosely around common themes rather than a tightly knit argument pursued rigorously from beginning to end. In other words, the work is a series of sketches from the artist’s notebook, as opposed to one intricate and detailed portrait focusing on a single subject. [End Page 207]In the first five chapters of the book, Anderson sketches a picture of the elderly Karl Barth who served as his “doktorvater,” drawing material from his student notes and personal memories of the years he spent with Barth in Basel. While Anderson finds continuity between the earlier and later writings of Barth, he suggests that the older Barth began to increasingly unfold the “fuller, grace-centered and human-shaped positive implications” of the earlier writings (viii). In Anderson’s experience, Barth’s early appeal to “Let God be God!” had in those later years “mellowed to an even deeper appeal to let God be himself, human as well, in the most unexpected ways” (11). This mellowing extended beyond Barth’s writing to his personality and demeanor as a teacher and theologian. The Barth whom Anderson knew was humble, understated, and compassionate, a sympathetic listener and a generous interpreter—in short, an “un-dogmatic” dogmatician (139).In the sixth chapter, Anderson shifts gears and reproduces extensive transcriptions of his own notes from several of Barth’s biweekly English-language colloquia on the topics of natural theology, the Old Testament promise, Paul Tillich, and existentialism. Anderson suggests that these notes are particularly valuable because in them one witnesses Barth explaining the bare essentials of his thinking in clear and simple English terms. This is true for large portions of the transcriptions. However, it must be said that there are also portions of these transcriptions that suffer from the lack of clarity that one might expect to find in student notes of discussions conducted in a language with which Barth was not completely comfortable. Nevertheless, these transcriptions provide previously unpublished primary source material from Barth that is worth examining.From chapter 7 until the end of the book, Anderson takes up the task of “sketching key insights and special teachings from the mature Barth that in the years since Barth’s death have shown themselves to carry special significance for our American college classroom, church school, and pulpit” (205). These include, but are not limited to, Barth’s attitude toward America, his emphasis on the priority of grace, his theology of nature (not his natural theology), and his positions on theories of religion, satisfaction theories of the atonement, election, universalism, and even the possibility of extraterrestrial life. This section also includes... (shrink)

Concepts, Kovesi argued in Moral Notions and elsewhere, are formed from a point of view; they express relevant needs, wants, interests, ideals, and attitudes, and are formed from a point of view that can be anybody’s. The point of view need not be everybody’s (not everybody is interested in chess, for example), but it is a point of view that can be taken by anybody. The point of view expresses our purpose in forming the concept (p. 48)1; it is the (...) point of view of somebody dealing with certain sorts of problems, and that determines which material elements will come under the concept. But Kovesi refuses to explain in any of his writings what the moral point of view is, and says that it is no part of his project to explain that (see especially pp. 105 ff). This is not a matter of his refusing to say whether he is taking a Utilitarian point of view or an Emotivist point of view of anything of that sort. His question is a much more basic one about the logical structure of moral concepts and their relationships to the problems morality is formed to deal with. His refusal to explain the moral point of view is puzzling. The moral point of view that Kovesi envisaged, I think, is the point of view of members of a species the members of which have to get on together, a species members of which have the qualities of character that enable them to get on together. (shrink)

In this paper, I work out a five-stringed criticism of John Hattie’s theory of Visible Learning. First, I argue that the theory is a theory of evaluation that denies education as such. Second, I show that there are problems with the dependent variable, learning, i.e. the effect of a given intervention. Thirdly, I show that Hattie's theory belongs to the radical constructivist paradigm. Thus, the problems of constructivism, i.e. problems of normativity and the outside world, walks directly into Hattie’s concept (...) of teaching, resulting in a double breakdown of the essence of teaching. Fourth, I argue that Hattie’s concept of feedback has a centralizing trend which ultimately has the potential to transform the country’s educational activities into a big hierarchical and data-driven organism. Finally, I show that Hattie’s reference to Karl Popper’s theory of “three worlds” is based on a highly problematic reading, where Popper’s objective world is reduced to a subset of a radical subjectivity. (shrink)

This book is a timely new interpretation of the moral and political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. Staying close to Hobbes's text and working from a careful examination of the actual substance of the account of natural law, R.E. Ewin argues that Hobbes well understood the importance of moral behavior to civilized society. This interpretation stands as a much-needed corrective to readings of Hobbes that emphasize the rationally calculated, self-interested nature of human behavior. It poses a significant challenge to currently fashionable (...) game theoretic reconstructions of Hobbesian logic. It is generally agreed that Hobbes applied what he took to be a geometrical method to political theory. But, as Ewin forcefully argues, modern readers have misconstrued Hobbes's geometric method, and this has led to a series of misunderstandings of Hobbes's view of the relationship between politics and morality. Important implications of Ewin's reading are that Hobbes never thought that "the war of each against all" was an empirical possibility for citizens; that his political theory actually presupposes moral agency; and that Hobbes's account of natural law forces us to the conclusion that Hobbes was a virtue theorist. This major contribution to Hobbes studies will be praised and criticized, welcomed and challenged, but it cannot be ignored. All philosophers, political theorists, and historians of ideas dealing with Hobbes will need to take account of it. (shrink)

In 1897 physicists took the first e/m measurements at electrons, the consequence was a revival of the atomistic ideas in physics. The researches in geophysics also contributed to the construction of the modern physics. Four examples are dealt with this essay. 1) In 1899 J. J. Thomson was able to carry out the first direct determination of elementary electric charge with the help of the conformity with the natural laws at the formation of fog, found by C. T. R. Wilson. (...) 2) The cloud-chamber, called after C. T. R. Wilson, was the result of various constructions of for- or cloud-chambers, in it there were shown for the first time the tracks of α- and β-particles. 3) At the exploration of the photoelectric effect of the sunlight (especially of the ultraviolet share) Elster and Geitel made essential preliminary studies for the lightquanta-hypothesis of Einstein. 4) Elster and Geitel detected radioactive substances in the atmosphere and in the soil to be the main source of the atmospheric electricity. (shrink)

A great amount of scholarly attention has been devoted to Karl Rahner’s early philosophical writings, but his theological work from the same time period remains only marginally known. While his dissertation in philosophy, Spirit in the World, has been published in multiple editions and in many languages, his dissertation in theology, E latere Christi, was only available in archives until it was published in the third volume of his collected works, Sämtliche Werke. Exploring the content of this third volume (...) which contains Rahner’s early writing on the spirituality and theology of the Church Fathers, this article illuminates a neglected part of Rahner’s career: his fascination with patristic thought during his early, formative years. It also identifies themes in these early writings which reappear in his more well known mature writings on the theology of das Symbol, soteriology, mystery, and the importance of historical theology for the activity of today’s theologian. (shrink)

J. Krishnamurti (1895-1986) was thought by many to be a modern-day equivalent of the Buddha. In fact, he was once even considered to be the second coming of Christ. While many think it wonderful to live and work in close proximity with such a person, it's difficult to understand the depth of what this means and how challenging this might be. In Knocking at the Open Door, author R.E. Mark Lee provides an ordinary person view of what being close-up and (...) working together with such a man means, how it challenges one at every turn, and how it causes one to question ceaselessly, even more deeply than one ordinarily would. Lee offers an insightful, candid, and heartfelt narrative that reveals various unknown facets of the eminent world teacher J. Krishnamurti and highlights his distinctive vision for education worldwide. This comprehensive volume brings alive the practical and everyday interactions Lee had with Krishnamurti during a twenty-year period in India and the United Sates. Knocking at the Open Door shares a clear and honest account that demonstrates the challenges of working with Krishnamurti in running a school that is true to the teaching and yet able to function in the reality of modern parental, student, and educational establishment expectations. (shrink)

This study represents an improvement in the ethics scales inventory published in a 1988 Journal of Business Ethics article. The article presents the distillation and validation process whereby the original 33 item inventory was reduced to eight items. These eight items comprise the following ethical dimensions: a moral equity dimension, a relativism dimension, and a contractualism dimension. The multidimensional ethics scale demonstrates significant predictive ability.

The thesis of this article is that there has never been any ground for the controversy between the doctrine of free will and determinism, that it is based upon a misapprehension, that the two assertions are entirely consistent, that one of them strictly implies the other, that they have been opposed only because of our natural want of the analytical imagination. In so saying I do not tamper with the meaning of either phrase. That would be unpardonable. I mean free (...) will in the natural and usual sense, in the fullest, the most absolute sense in which for the purposes of the personal and moral life the term is ever employed. I mean it as implying responsibility, merit and demerit, guilt and desert. I mean it as implying, after an act has been performed, that one " could have done otherwise " than one did. I mean it as conveying these things also, not in any subtly modified sense but in exactly the sense in which we conceive them in life and in law and in ethics. These two doctrines have been opposed because we have not realised that free will can be analysed without being destroyed, and that determinism is merely a feature of the analysis of it. And if we are tempted to take refuge in the thought of an "ultimate ", an "innermost" liberty that eludes the analysis, then we have implied a deterministic basis and constitution for this liberty as well. For such a basis and constitution lie in the idea of liberty. -/- The thesis is not, like that of Green or Bradley, that the contending opinions are reconciled if we adopt a certain metaphysic of the ego, as that it is timeless, and identifies itself with a desire by a " timeless act". This is to say that the two are irreconcilable, as they are popularly supposed to be, except by a theory that delivers us from the conflict by taking us out of time. Our view on the contrary is that from the natural and temporal point of view itself there never was any need of a reconciliation but only of a comprehension of the meaning of terms. (The metaphysical nature of the self and its identity through time is a problem for all who confront memory, anticipation, etc.; it has no peculiar difficulties arising from the present problem.) -/- I am not maintaining that determinism is true; only that it is true insofar as we have free will. That we are free in willing is, broadly speaking, a fact of experience. That broad fact is more assured than any philosophical analysis. It is therefore surer than the deterministic analysis of it, entirely adequate as that in the end appears to be. But it is not here affirmed that there are no small exceptions, no slight undetermined swervings, no ingredient of absolute chance. All that is here said is that such absence of determination, if and so far as it exists, is no gain to freedom, but sheer loss of it; no advantage to the moral life, but blank subtraction from it. -- When I speak below of "the indeterminist" I mean the libertarian indeterminist, that is, him who believes in free will and holds that it involves indetermination. (shrink)

Volume 1 of this biography of L. E. J. Brouwer was published in 1999.1 The volume under review here covers the period from the early nineteen twenties until Brouwer's death in 1966. It also includes a short epilogue that discusses the disposition of Brouwer's estate after his death, his influence on others, the paths of some of his students and colleagues, and other matters. Van Dalen notes in the Preface that in preparing this volume he consulted some historical studies that (...) appeared after the first volume was published. He also used new material from various archives. The biography contains interesting quotations from unpublished materials in the Brouwer Archive and from correspondence. The bibliographical references to Brouwer's publications, it should be noted, are somewhat different in this volume. This volume, like the first, contains some nice photographs and reproductions. I noted that there were many typographical errors in the earlier book but Volume 2 is relatively free of them.As is the case in Volume 1, the discussion of Brouwer's mathematical and philosophical work is woven into the narrative of Brouwer's life and times. The story in this volume starts with Brouwer's first contacts with Paul Alexandrov and Paul Urysohn in 1923. The interaction began when Urysohn announced that he had found a mistake in Brouwer's definition of dimension in Brouwer's 1913 paper on natural dimension. Was it just a slip of the pen, as Brouwer always maintained , or something more substantial? Urysohn and Alexandrov ultimately came to agree with Brouwer on the matter, and Urysohn was prepared to grant Brouwer priority for the definition of dimension. There were, however, ups and downs along the way. Karl Menger, through his own work in topology and dimension theory, soon got into the picture, and Brouwer and Menger were to …. (shrink)

With the publication of this volume from the prolific pen of one of Germany's outstanding younger philosophers, the German-speaking scholarly world has a more extensive survey of key issues in the philosophy of science than the English-speaking world. The book is the first of a comprehensive work whose title is "Problems and Results in the Philosophy of Science and Analytic Philosophy." While the title of the book under consideration shows that it is primarily concerned with scientific explanation and justification, Stegmüller (...) not merely undertakes to acquaint his readers with the most important Anglo-American developments concerning these topics, but also independently develops his own ideas with respect to them and an important, if brief, feature of the volume is an appendix in which he sets forth over thirty "problems that are either unsolved or the solution of which is controversial." Without going into substantival detail, perhaps the quickest way to indicate Stegmüller's main concerns and general orientation is to note the extent of the page references in the index of names where, in descending order, one finds the names of Carl G. Hempel, to whom the volume is dedicated, R. Carnap, N. Goodman, N. Rescher, W. V. Quine, P. Oppenheim, E. Nagel, W. Dray and K. Popper. Curiously, Stegmüller indicates that, aside from Hempel, the man who has exercised the greatest influence on him has been Sir Karl Popper, but then he limits his consideration of him mainly to Popper's early exposition of explanation by reference to the breaking of a thread, while ignoring what he has to say about such topics as falsification, induction, and the problem of demarcation. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that there are no references to P. Duhem, J. Agassi, and P. Feyerabend, but there are also none to G. Bergmann, M. Bunge, P. Frank, N. R. Hanson, A. Koyré, V. Kraft, G. Radnitzky, and J. J. C. Smart, to mention just a few.--R. F. M. (shrink)

In this book, R.E. Allen provides a translation of the 'Parmenides' along with a structural analysis that procedes on the assumption that formal elements, logical and dramatic, are important to its interpretation and that the argument of the Parmenides is aporetic, a statement of metaphysical perplexities.

Evidence based medicine has been a topic of considerable controversy in medical and health care circles over its short lifetime, because of the claims made by its exponents about the criteria used to assess the evidence for or against the effectiveness of medical interventions. The central epistemological debates underpinning the debates about evidence based medicine are reviewed by this paper, and some areas are suggested where further work remains to be done. In particular, further work is needed on the theory (...) of evidence and inference; causation and correlation; clinical judgment and collective knowledge; the structure of medical theory; and the nature of clinical effectiveness. (shrink)

This is a study in what Naess calls the "new historiography of science," i.e., the view that science is and has been discontinuous, non-accumulative, and somewhat arbitrary. Readers familiar with the controversy between Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper will undoubtedly note that Naess attempts to achieve a synthesis of their opposed positions. Against Popper, Naess argues there is no standard of rejection and refutation for theories in science that will bear the weight of both the history and present practice (...) of the various disciplines. Instead there are many such standards and herein lies the "pluralistic aspect" of the scientific enterprise. But contrary to Kuhn, irrationalism is not found to be the alternative to a Popperian framework. What is required according to Naess is a broader conception of rationality and decision making than classical philosophers and historians of science were willing to embrace. The outline of such a conception is presented here. Naess also favors encouragement of a methodological pluralistic approach since he finds that the possibilities are almost endless. Nor is the history of science exempt from this invitation. In a final chapter Naess turns his thesis to historiography itself and explores the consequences of pluralism and possibilism in this field.—R.P.M. (shrink)

With the publication of this volume from the prolific pen of one of Germany's outstanding younger philosophers, the German-speaking scholarly world has a more extensive survey of key issues in the philosophy of science than the English-speaking world. The book is the first of a comprehensive work whose title is "Problems and Results in the Philosophy of Science and Analytic Philosophy." While the title of the book under consideration shows that it is primarily concerned with scientific explanation and justification, Stegmüller (...) not merely undertakes to acquaint his readers with the most important Anglo-American developments concerning these topics, but also independently develops his own ideas with respect to them and an important, if brief, feature of the volume is an appendix in which he sets forth over thirty "problems that are either unsolved or the solution of which is controversial." Without going into substantival detail, perhaps the quickest way to indicate Stegmüller's main concerns and general orientation is to note the extent of the page references in the index of names where, in descending order, one finds the names of Carl G. Hempel, to whom the volume is dedicated, R. Carnap, N. Goodman, N. Rescher, W. V. Quine, P. Oppenheim, E. Nagel, W. Dray and K. Popper. Curiously, Stegmüller indicates that, aside from Hempel, the man who has exercised the greatest influence on him has been Sir Karl Popper, but then he limits his consideration of him mainly to Popper's early exposition of explanation by reference to the breaking of a thread, while ignoring what he has to say about such topics as falsification, induction, and the problem of demarcation. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that there are no references to P. Duhem, J. Agassi, and P. Feyerabend, but there are also none to G. Bergmann, M. Bunge, P. Frank, N. R. Hanson, A. Koyré, V. Kraft, G. Radnitzky, and J. J. C. Smart, to mention just a few.--R. F. M. (shrink)

Corporate social responsibility is a recognised and common part of business activity. Some of the regularly cited motives behind CSR are employee morale, recruitment and retention, with employees acknowledged as a key organisational stakeholder. Despite the significance of employees in relation to CSR, relatively few studies have examined their engagement with CSR and the impediments relevant to this engagement. This exploratory case study-based research addresses this paucity of attention, drawing on one to one interviews and observation in a large UK (...) energy company. A diversity of engagement was found, ranging from employees who exhibited detachment from the CSR activities within the company, to those who were fully engaged with the CSR activities, and to others who were content with their own personal, but not organisational, engagement with CSR. A number of organisational context impediments, including poor communication, a perceived weak and low visibility of CSR culture, and lack of strategic alignment of CSR to business and personal objectives, served to explain this diversity of employee engagement. Social exchange theory is applied to help explore the volition that individual employees have towards their engagement with CSR activities, and to consider the implications of an implicit social, rather than explicit economic, contract between an organisation and its employees in their engagement with CSR. (shrink)